THOUGHT: "The Nature of Moderny Colonel-General A. Babadthanyan.
OF COrfTEHT
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Followingerba tic translation of an article titled "The Itoture of Modernritten by Colonel-General A. Babadzhanyan.
This article appeared in1 First Isauepecial version of the Soviet military Journal Voyeoaayu Mysl (Military Thoughtj. This Journal ia published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. This issue was consigned to the printer3
Headquarters Ctxsxnt: The article byastilovichcited below wasTolkooyuk's
will soon be publishedBaskakov's article
is in nand and will be forwarded as soon"as processing is completed.
Th- Nature of Kcdern Warfare
by Colonel-General A. Babadzhanyan
With great Interest and attention, we read tbe article of Major-Geoeral Goryalnov depicting the technical-mathematical bases of future warfare, the article of Colonel-General Castilovich which, on this technical basis, analyses tbe new possible methods for conducting war, the articles of Generals Tolkooyuk and Baskakov echoing in many respects the article of General Castilovich, and finally, the article by General of the Army Kurochklo which expresses serious criticism of tbe basic positions taken in the articles of Comrades Gastilovich, Tolkooyuk, and Baskakov.
Ue oust admit that upon first reading the articles by Generals Gastilovich and Goryalnov, some degree of doubt was created regarding the proper course along which ouris developing and, consequently, regarding the correctness of tbe principles on which our armed forces are being built. However, subsequent deliberations, and study of the problem have, in cur opinion, shown that In many "rSSpecTTtbe authors mentioned are wrong; They have simply "laid" It ono torue, it must be admitted that such "exaggeration"is useful. It will force our military specialists to analyze the nature of modem warfare more profoundly and to draw practical conclusionsound basis with consideration for the new conditions io military theory, as well as in the field of its practical Implementation.
The article by General of the Army Kurochkin appears to us to be much more realistic and to reveal in greater depth the possible conditions and nuances of future warfare.
One of the basic problems discussed is the following: Does Soviet military doctrine require fundamental review, is Soviet military artrisis? General Gastilovich Insists that this is so, while General Kurochkin answers in the negative. This natter Is complicated and fundamental.
We oust agree with General Kurochkin that weilitary doctrine which dwells on the mass use of nuclear weapons, Including those in the megaton class. This is attested to by the report. Khrushchev to the0 scssioniof the Supreme Soviet, ln which be depicted the possible nature of the beginning and
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tha development of modern warfare. However, the principles for the* use of tbe types of armed forces and arcs of troops within tbecreated by this doctrine ore not yet sufficiently elaborated. The views of tbe authors of both articles coincide- on-this. They claim that Soviet militsry-scientific thought, led by tbe new military doctrine, has only begun to develop and to determine those laws and principles which must be established sa tbe basis for arced conflict in its modern phase.
This is true for both the strategic and operational scales. It is sufficient to imagine, forront offensive operation in which tbe front troop commander has at his disposal two or three eegaton warheads. Or, on the other band, that there are such weapons at the disposal of tbe contender of tbe enemy group opposing the front. It can be stated with complete assurance that the front operation under such conditions will assume fores other than those under conditions when only kilotoo warheads are available.
General Castllovlch's important and possibly basic mistake is due to the fact that in defining future warfare, he approached It too narrowly, without taklDg into account political and economic factors, and without consideration for the existence of various theaters of military operations, each with different conditions.
Proceeding from the premise that there wouldorld war with unrestricted use of nuclear weapons, the author arrived at the wrong conclusions regarding the number of armed forces necessary toar and the nature of the actions of ground troops in offensive and defensive operations of modern warfare.
iew to analyzing seme of the positions expressed In the articles of Generals Gastilovicb, Tolkonyuk, and Baskakov, let us dwell in more detail on individual questions of military art.
First of all, it must be recognized that the yieldheraonuclear weapon is extraordinarily high. It is still difficult for one to grasp and evaluate It. The radiological factor of destruction Is particularly great. For0 megaton bomb is capable of destroying Industrial and municipal structures over an areaquare kms; this Is sufficient to destroy any capital. Radioactive contamination resulting fromurst will be such that under average wind velocity ms/brj all persons in an area ofquare kms0 kms) will perish from radiation sickness, aad in an area of0 square kmso kms)
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aboutercent of the persons will perish and the rest will lose combat (working) effectiveness for several months, and finally, all those in ao area upquare kmstCO kms) /Tic/ will partially lose combat (working) effectiveness- This means, for example, that an industrial area such as the Ruhr can be knocked out of actionong time byegaton boobsesult of the destruction of basic Installations and of the annihilation of the labor force.
According to tbe estimates of American specialists, the use ofuclear weapons against the principal cities of the USA would kill off about one half of the total population and would destroy up toercent of all industrial enterprises. According to this same estimate, the USAotalrban areas ln which the principal body of the population and Industrial plants is concentrated. Consequently, the useuclear weapons over the territory of the USA would knock out up to three fourths of the Industryignificant portion of the population of tbe USA. Considering the high degree of industrial cooperation in producing complicated military equipment, one can say thatlow would halt production of armament and supplies for the army and Its demise would beatter of time.
But what would be the consequencesimilar blow against our country?
The large territorial expanses, the great dispersion of population
s_wi.llignificant re duct Ion "in the effect oTmassive thermonuclear attack against ouronly reduce the effect! Results of abe significant enougnTto require the most extreme humanrestore order in tbe country and to ensure tbe capability offorces toounterblow""aiid to seize the
Under modern conditions, aggressive circles possibly may not ar, if only because they recognize the impossibility of depriving tbe Soviet Union,esult of one strike, of the capability ofevastating counterblow.
But this situation cannot be permanent. The power of theattack in modern times is not determined by'the supplybuthe availability of the means to deliver tbem
Acccrdiog_to estimates, the OSA at present has thermonuclear"quantity to build' iMg^'on vs^eads. ThVJWTO countries' basic means for delivery of nuclear "weapons ona* strategic scale is still aircraft. Our possession of highly effective antiaircraft missile weapons does not allow them the necessary degree of confidence in their capability to deliver nuclear weapons by this means. The strategic missiles at their disposal clearly cannot satisfy the requirementsajor war, and. In addition, their quality Is not high, since, according to assertions of the Americans themselves, onlyercent of the missiles launched reach their target.
This is the situation today. What will the situation beuture tloe, when governments which do not now have sufficient numbers of missiles will overcome their shortcomings in this type of armament? In the future, the probable enemy willreater capability to deliver surprise massive nuclear strikes in order toignificant portion of Industrial targets, administrative-political centers, missile-launching sites, strategic aviation airfields, and other vital areas and Installations. owerful, practically simultaneous initial strike can destroy tbe most Important and crucial installations of the country, disorganize national control, disrupt BObilizetioo and deployment of armed forces, and severely reduce tbe combat effectiveness of the army and the country hole.
This Is so serious In its possible political and economic consequences that every measure must be taken so that if the Imperialists try toar it will not beginudden massed enemy nuclear strike.
The peace-loving foreign policy of our Party and the Soviet Government is known to all. It stems from the very natureocialist state. Wc^do not want war and our Party is conducting constant work in the direction ofew world war, which would demand huge numbers of victims and would destroy ail that bis been created by human bands. However, if it becomes evident that aggressive forces, have decided "on war; and that the Initiation of military operations Isuestionhort time, and if we fail to prevent the aggressor's attack by diplomatic means, then It is necessary to wreck the enemy strike by all our available forces Under 8uch conditions, tbe strategic concept of the armed farces of our country must be based on the total annihilation of all enemy capabilities to. accomplish his aggressive schemes during
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the first days of the
The question may be asked: When will these new conditions come about? from what year or what date must our armed forces be guided by the new concept! The_number .of..missiles, and launching sites grows gradually, and occasiccally.in.spurts. Tbe precise determination of the period of the transition of the quantity of these means to the new category is difficult and unnecessary. What should be done now and quickly is to prepare and organize our intelligence and tbe armed forces lnay that they will beonstant state of readiness to deliverlow against the aggressor.
The possession of missiles, particularly intercontinental,eans for delivering nuclear weapons, permits the conduct of preparations for an attack in utmost secrecy. Under these conditions, the work of our intelligence organs will be very difficult. Possibly, information about aggressor preparations for an attack will be received only at the last minute before the beginning of an attack. Thisew approach to the preparation and definition of the stage of readiness of our own means of attack.
Regarding the matter of the numerical size of armed forces, and specifically of the ground troops. We agree with the assertion of General Gastilovich that, in order to accomplish specific strategic and operational tasks in modern warfare, smaller numbers of forces will be required than in post wars. However, In making this conclusion, we must not forget that the number of strategic and operational task* to be fulfilled in modern warfare will be Incomparably greater than in the past.
In the eventlobal war, today our. armed forces will be required to operate simultaneously in many theaters of military operations, including the.Arctic- Considering the wide use of means of mass destruction, which will create heavy demands for replacements in the active armies, andumber of cases for their full re-constitution, one can say that to modern war more massive armed forces win be needed than those discussed by Comrade Gastilovich.
General Gastilovich considers that the role of ground troops in modern warfare will be essentially that of "occupation". In order to seize countries subjected to massed strikes by megaton bombs, ground troops need only overcome zones of partial and total destruction. Thus, the author excludes the bringing up o? large operational and, what is more, of strategic reserves. On the basis, of this, one reaches
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the conclusion that in the Western TVD (Theater of Military0 divisions would be required to accomplish the war's tasks. There is no need to engage in polemics regarding the number ofO One thing is clear,ufficient number of troops must be available to make possible tbe rapid replacement of large units knocked out of action by nuclear weapon strikes. There will be numerous such situstlons. It seems to us that General Gastllovicfa's estimates are too optimistic.
Korean we agree with the view of Generals Gastilovich and Baskakov that, under modem conditions, the distinction between defensive and offensive operations has been erased. We agree with the authors that the conduct of offensive or defensive operations will be conditioned by the number of nuclear weapons and their delivery means which are allottediven front. let us add to this the fact that the conduct of one or another type of operation will depend essentially on the relative quantities of nuclear weapons and their delivery means available to the front and to the enemy grouping opposing the front.
At the same time it ia Impossible to agree that as offensive which differsefensive one in the purpose of the action will resemble it in the methods of tactical actions of large units (Gastilovich) or with the concept that the difference in conducting ffense and defense will be retained only in tactics (Baskakov).
He fully agree with the view of General Kurochkln, who
that mass employment of nuclear weapons does not erase the boundaries between offensive operations and defensive operations, but givesnique character requiring the development of new methods for conducting offensive and defensive operations. Actually, what can there be in comaon between an operation whose goal is to crush enemy resistance and to penetrate into tbe depth of his territory, and an operation whose goal Is to prevent enemy penetration and consequently to hold specific terrain and establish conditions favorable for a
switchounter-offensive? In cur view, such an assertion could hove been node only In view of the denial by General Gastilovich that
a stable defense is necessary.
hmyUflliCy defefl!e' operational included, without this quality, defense as such ceases to exist and becomes meaningless. Let us Imagine,oment, the defense of an Important economic or strategic area which does not have stability and In which stability is not required. Host probably,efense will not
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accomplish Its defensive tasks aad tbe Installations defended can be surrendered to the enemy without any particular feeling of responsibility.
Defensive operations eust, unquestionably, be stable. However, bbbo use of nuclear weapons has its impact on this concept. If the previous concept ofpecific. If ooe any use tbe expression, "linearity" (the holdingpecific line) now, under present conditions, stability must be referred to as being established within the depthector of tbe territory.
Let us clarify this thought. To bold specific rones, positions, or centers, when tbe attacking enemyufficient number of nuclear weapons. Is practically Impossible. Therefore, one cannot speak of "linear" stability. Tbe offensive can be halted onlyystem of massed nuclear strikes, counterattacks, and counterstrlkeo. This can be done, however, onlypecific depth of the defense. In each case the rear boundary of tbe defensive depth must be determined on tht basis of specific conditions of tba situation, In
which the main factor Is the relative strength In weapons of mass
destruction possessed by the sttacker and tbe defender.
Under these conditions, should defensive zones be established? General Gastilovich says that tbey should not. We do not agree with, this. We know that tbe enecy will use gaps and open flanks during his attack. Therefore, we can channel the enecy offense along directions which are advantageous to us by establishing zones and centers in specific areas. In addition, defensive structures serve as troop protection against nuclear weapons. It is more advantageous to build defensive structures whichual purpose (tbe protection of personnel and equipment and increasing the stability of the defense) rather than shelters et concentration areas with the sole function of protection.
We also consider General Gastilovich's view regarding the use of nuclear weapons In defensive operations to be Incorrect. Be rejects both the necessity for delivering massed nuclear strikes to disrupt the enemy offensive end the desirability cf conducting counterpreparations.
The wide use of nuclear weapons changes the method for conducting defensive operations. How, it Is of paramount importance that action be taken to disrupt or to diminish tbe strength of enecy preparations for the offensive. Hissed employment ofimited number of nuclear weapons can place tbe enemyituation where he may be
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forced to cancel bis offensive. In this case, the greatest significance will unquestionably be attached to counterpreparations directed primarily against the enemy's deployed nuclear means of attack and his troop groupings.
In Ugbt of this, the proposal to limit ourselves to day by day end Immediate destruction of detected enemy nuclear attack weapons and to Individual (to the degree possible) nuclear strikes at varying times against bis most dangerous enemy tank divisions which have broken through, sounds strange, to ssy the least. Even more strange is the fearassed strike by nuclear weapons can lead to the growthefense into an offensive. First of all,rowth is unlikely, considering the relative relationship of nuclear weapons, and secondly, It should be welcoaed rather than feared.
In conclusion, we would like to dwell on the role of tanks under modern conditions. The development of tanks as an effective striking force from the time of the first world war until now was conditioned by the fact that the tank emerged victorious in the competition with antitank weapons. Today the development and serial production of antitank missile launchers whichigh effectiveness both with respect to accuracy and destructive action, haveew situation.
In singleank against an antitank missile launcher, the tank will usually lose. This means thatigh enough" concentration of antitank missile launchers on the fieldcoabat, any tank attack can be disruptedarge portion of the tanks and their crews participating in the attack will be destroyed. But If ue consider further that the production of an antitank missile launcher costs several tens of thousands of rubles andank costs several hundreds of thousandsof rubles, then it becomes clear that tbe use of tanks in their modern concept in warfare is unprofitable both militarily and economically.
In our view, heavy tanks must depart from the scene. Tbey should e replaced by medium and, particularly, light, combat vehicles armed with an automatic multi-round missile launcherrazing range ms, equipped with anti-small arms fire, and splinter-proof armor, and capable of crossing water barriers.
The basis for this combat vehicle can be the amphibious tank, It must be kept in mind that, under modern conditions, troops must cover great distances on their own power both during preparation
for, ae well as during the courie of, combat and that possibly It would be more advantageous toombat vehicle with an especially high cross-country capability wheel drive with three or four axles.
Tbe proposed combat vehicles, retaining tbe basic positive quality of tanksstability against tbe destructive factorsuclearould coat much lass, would be easier to produce, and would be more effective tn their firing action.
Hot considering that tho views expressed In this article are tbe only correct ones, wo trusteview of the large and basic questions raised by this issue of tbe Collection will serve to develop individual views corresponding to the modern conditions of conducting an operation.
Original document.
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